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Mental Files and the Theory of 
Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey
Eleonora Orlando
In this work I reply to Zoltán Vecsey’s criticisms of the semantic account of fictional names I put forward 
in Orlando (2017). The main tenet of that proposal is that fictional names refer to individual concepts, 
which I understand in terms of mental files. In Vecsey (2020), the author presents three main objections: 
(i) no referential shift can be ascribed to fictional names, (ii) fictional names are supposed to play two 
conflicting functions, and (iii) the mental file framework is incompatible with an antirealist view of 
fictional objects. Although the objections are deep and thoughtful, the challenge they involve can be 
met if certain aspects of the proposal are clarified and developed. | Keywords: Fictional Name, Fictional 
Concept, Mental File, Fictional Narrative, Antirealism vs. Realism About Fiction
In Fictional Objects within the Theory of Mental Files: Problems and Prospects 
(Vecsey, 2020), Zoltán Vecsey does two main things: (i) he criticises the thesis 
that mental file theory allows for a particular grounding of antirealism about 
fictional discourse, which I  proposed in my (2017) paper; and (ii) he defends 
the view that mental file theory fits better with realism than with antirealism 
about fiction. In this reply, I will be concerned with his objections but will not 
examine his positive view. Although Vecsey’s  objections are rigorous, 
interesting and thoughtful, I  think that the above-mentioned proposal has 
been partially misinterpreted. I will then attempt to clarify some aspects of my 
semantic position regarding fictional names so as to make it clear how it can be 
considered to meet Vecsey’s main objections. 
The core purpose of my (2017) paper has been defending the thesis that 
fictional names refer to individual concepts, which in turn I  proposed to 
construe in terms of mental files. Files are a  new way of conceiving of 
particular concepts, whether individual or indexical: a mental file is a mental 
representation that stores and anchors information (and misinformation) 
about a certain particular under a certain label (Perry, 2001; Jeshion, 2009 and 
2010; Korta and Perry, 2011; Recanati 2012). Mental files are relationally, as 
opposed to satisfactionally, identified: in a  paradigmatic case, whereas 
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a descriptive concept applies to a particular by virtue of the fact that it satisfies 
a certain description (satisfactionally), a mental file applies to a particular by 
virtue of the fact that it is directly related to it (relationally). The set of direct 
relations between a  mental file and the corresponding particular includes 
perception, memory, testimony, and the historical chains of communication 
underlying the use of proper names – those relations are usually characterised 
as different forms of ‘acquaintance’. By deploying mental files one is able to 
entertain thoughts about particulars, namely, singular thoughts. That capacity 
is thus naturally associated with the capacity to use sentences containing 
genuinely referential expressions, like proper names and indexicals. Files are 
then the mental counterparts of singular terms; as just explained, they are 
individual and indexical concepts. 
Now, to defend my central claim, I have argued that when an author introduces 
a fictional name in the process of creating a fictional narrative, even if there is 
no typical material particular she is related to, she can be taken to open 
a  mental file for a  fictional character – since files need not be grounded on 
typical material particulars. It is then possible to think that her referential 
intention is directed towards the file opened in association with the 
character’s name, whose main function is to store and anchor information and 
misinformation concerning that character. Now, the consequent thesis that the 
fictional name refers to the corresponding file can be considered to be a novel 
application of Frege’s idea that the kind of entity a word refers to depends on 
the kind of sentential context in which the word occurs – from now on, I will 
allude to it as Frege’s Referential Shift thesis.
According to Frege (1892), when occurring in certain sentential contexts, such 
as direct quotations and attitude ascriptions, words must be taken to refer not 
to the usual objects they refer to, such as typical material particulars, but to 
themselves or to their customary senses, respectively. The following fragment 
makes this idea manifest: 
If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is 
their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk 
about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, 
when the words of another are quoted. One’s  own words then first 
designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their 
usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are 
in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing 
between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary 
reference. […] In reported speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of 
another person’s remarks. It is quite clear that in this way of speaking 
words do  not have their customary reference but designate what is 
usually their sense. In order to have a short expression, we will say: in 
reported speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect 
reference. (Frege, 1892, pp. 58-9)
Quotation marks and most psychological verbs are thus indicative of 
a  departure from usual reference, namely, of a  referential shift; words 
themselves and senses are the kinds of entities reference might shift to. My 
idea was then that in writing fiction, as there is no possible outward referential 
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1 As pointed out by Simpson (1964, pp. 113-4), Frege does not provide us with a general 
criterion to recognise the kinds of sentential contexts that involve a referential shift.
2 All the ensuing quotations of Vecsey’s work belong to the same article.
intention, one could take reference to shift from typical material particulars to 
concepts in the realm of thought. In other words, since the author of a fictional 
narrative is not primarily concerned with the typical material world, the 
fictional names she introduces can be thought to refer to the mental files she 
opens for her characters, namely, to fictional individual concepts. Falling short 
of a  syntactic device like quotation marks or psychological verbs, it is the 
author’s  referential intentions that can be thought to do  the job, namely, 
signalling the presence of what Frege called an “oblique” context, that is, 
a context in which reference has shifted.1  
As is clear from Frege’s  account, the ontological commitment to both words 
and senses is motivated independently of the Referential Shift thesis: the 
existence of words as units of language is taken for granted, and senses are 
posited to account for the difference in cognitive significance between pairs of 
sentences containing different but co-referential terms – namely, to solve the 
so-called Frege’s  Puzzle (Salmon, 1983). As it happens, the ontological 
commitment to mental files is also justified on independent reasons, since, as 
above emphasised, files are posited to account for singular thoughts or 
thoughts about particulars.
Now, Vecsey summarises his first objection in the following terms: 
“a referential shift cannot be elicited by intention alone.” (Vecsey, 2020, p. 40)2 
But, in so  claiming, I  think that he is misinterpreting my application of 
Frege’s  Referential Shift thesis. My original idea is neither that (i) fictional 
names start by being empty names and then shift their referents to mental 
files, nor that (ii) fictional names shift their referents to the different readers’ 
mental files according to the context of use, as it would follow if they behaved 
like demonstratives. As he acknowledges a  few lines ahead (pp. 40-41), 
I maintain that fictional names refer to mental files from the very first moment 
and all along: the files referred to originate in the author’s  mind during the 
process of creating the fictional narrative, and then give rise to the types of 
files constituting the thoughts that structure that narrative. The shift from 
usual material referents to files is determined by the fact that fictional names 
occur in peculiar sentential contexts, namely, when the corresponding 
sentences are used to create, read, interpret or critically analyse fiction – in 
other terms, when the corresponding sentences are fictively, parafictively or 
metafictively used. As is known, fictive uses are the uses of fictional sentences, 
by authors and readers, within the framework of the fictional narrative (such as 
the use of the first sentence in The hound of the Baskervilles, “Mr. Sherlock 
Holmes, who was usually very late in the mornings, save upon those not 
infrequent occasions when he was up all night, was seated at the breakfast 
table”); parafictive uses are reports of the fictional story facts from an external 
perspective (as in uttering “Holmes is a detective” in the course of a lecture on 
British literature); and, finally, metafictive ones are uses of fictional sentences 
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3 For the difference among fictive, parafictive and metafictive uses, also called ‘textual’, 
‘paratextual’ and ‘metatextual’, see, for instance, Bonomi (2008) and García-Carpintero (2015).
4 Throughout this note, I will use the feminine pronoun for the author and the masculine 
pronoun for the reader/critic.
to state facts that are, characteristically, not part of the fictional story (as when 
claiming “Holmes is an interesting character” or “Holmes does not exist”).3
More specifically, when an author introduces a fictional name in the process of 
creating a  fictional narrative, she can be taken to open a  mental file for 
a fictional character. In as far as that file is going to be tokened (or instanced) 
many times throughout the creation of the narrative, the different tokens (or 
instances) give rise to a  certain type of file. Introducing a  fictional name 
involves establishing a  correlation between a  name-type and a  file-type that 
will end up being part of a fixed system of correlations between sentence-types 
involving that name and thought-types involving the corresponding file – 
a  system that constitutes the conceptual world of the fiction at stake. That 
correlation (between a  name-type and a  file-type) can be construed as 
a referential relation, featuring on an unusual sentential context, namely, one 
in which the speaker’s  (namely, the author’s) referential intention targets not 
a  typical material object but a  character, given that she is involved in creating 
fiction. Likewise, when someone reads, memorises, recites or critically 
approaches that narrative, she will be taking part in a  communication chain 
leading to that file-type, namely, she will be borrowing the name’s referent by 
inserting himself in a chain originated by the author’s creation.4
A  clarification point is in order. The previous thesis does not amount to the 
claim that the author has a conscious intention to refer to her mental file: she 
has the conscious intention to refer to a  fictional character, her invention, 
a  figment of her imagination, which can be theoretically construed, 
unbeknownst to her, as a mental file. In other terms, the author has an intention 
concerning an object that is, as a matter of fact, a mental file but is not represented 
as such in the author’s mind. 
This idea can be rendered, more technically, in terms of the transparent/opaque 
distinction (Quine, 1956): according to this distinction, the linguistic 
ascription of a  complex mental state (namely, a  propositional attitude) to 
a  subject can be interpreted in two different ways. On the transparent 
interpretation, also called de re, it expresses a relation between the subject and 
a  certain particular, independently of how the particular is characterised (in 
the ascription). On the opaque interpretation, also called de dicto, it expresses 
a relation between the subject and a specific characterisation of a (purported) 
particular (included in the ascription). To take a  simple example, if Mark 
believes, concerning a  certain painter, Caravaggio, whose real name, 
Michelangelo Merisi, he ignores, that he was the best Baroque painter, the 
belief ascription “Mark believes that Michelangelo Merisi was the best Baroque 
painter” comes out true on the transparent interpretation, since the painter he 
is related to in having that belief was as a matter of fact Michelangelo Merisi, 
but is false on the opaque one, since Mark cannot characterise that painter by 
his real name, ‘Merisi’, but can only use his pseudonym, ‘Caravaggio’. Likewise, 
83ELEONORA ORLANDO Mental Files and the Theory of Fiction: A Reply to Zoltán Vecsey
when I  claim that the author of a  fictional narrative can be ascribed the 
intention to refer to her own file for a  character, I  mean that she can be 
ascribed an intention directed towards an object which, as a matter of fact, is 
a mental file but would not be described by her in those terms – given the fact 
that she is a creator of fiction, not a philosopher of language, and, as such, may 
have no particular metaphysical conception of fictional characters. The 
ascription to the author of a referential intention directed towards her own file 
must be interpreted in the transparent, not in the opaque, sense – in other 
terms, it is true on the transparent, not on the opaque, interpretation. In my 
opinion, it is the fact that Vecsey does not take this distinction into account 
that leads him to the misunderstanding that transpires in the following quote: 
Perhaps the first token occurrence of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the novel 
A  Study in Scarlet refers already to a  mental representation. Although 
this token occurrence seems to refer to a  person within its host 
sentence, this is only a  surface semantic effect. Actually, Conan Doyle 
introduced the name of his protagonist to refer to its mode of 
presentation (i.e., the HOLMES file). So  the argument may go. This 
would be a more plausible explanation for the alleged referential shift 
in the semantic profile of the name. If it is correct to assume that the 
profile of names depends, at least in part, on the semantically relevant 
aspects of their introduction, for example, in the semantic or 
communicative intentions of their introducers, then it can be imagined 
that instances of a certain kind of name are designed so that they refer 
to mental objects. The question is whether authors of fictional works 
introduce character names into their narratives in this manner. 
Regretfully, a definitive answer would require a  lengthy excursion into 
the cognitive/psychological theory of artistic creation, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. (p. 40)
To emphasise my previous point, the application of Frege’s  Referential Shift 
thesis to sentences containing fictional names has not been proposed as 
a  psychological hypothesis about what creators of fiction have consciously in 
mind when writing their narratives, and, in particular, when they introduce 
names for their characters: it is a  semantic hypothesis, more specifically, 
a hypothesis concerning both the referential status of fictional names and the 
ontological status of the corresponding referents, namely, something they 
might be completely unaware of qua competent speakers. From my 
perspective, not only the author but also the readers and critics of A Study in 
Scarlet can be considered to be referring to a fictional character, Holmes, in the 
intuitive sense of ‘referring’ and the intuitive sense of ‘fictional character’; but 
the theoretical status of that relation and the metaphysical nature of that 
fictional character can be, and usually are, beyond their ken.
Moving now into Vecsey’s  second objection, it is summarised in the following 
terms: on my account, “character names are supposed to perform two conflicting 
functions in fictional narratives.” (p. 40) The following fragment of the text 
expands on this idea:
[…] On the one hand, there is a semantic relation between the character 
name ‘Holmes’ and the HOLMES file. On the other, there is a  semantic 
relation that relates ‘Holmes’ to the Holmes character. And this is 
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narratives, among which we find literary artworks.
something that cannot be integrated into a  coherent semantic picture 
because ‘Holmes’ is related at once both to a  concrete particular (i.e. 
HOLMES file) and to an abstract object (i.e. the Holmes character). (p. 42) 
This is an important objection that presses the need for clarifying a metaphysical 
point concerning mental files, namely, for giving a precise answer to the question 
about what kind of object a mental file is from a metaphysical point of view. The 
core of the answer is that there is no conflict because the HOLMES file is the 
HOLMES character, namely, a type of concept (or a concept-type), and, as such, an 
abstract object of some sort. 
As previously explained, on my proposal, the HOLMES file, namely, the referent 
of ‘Holmes’, is conceived of in terms of a  type of file that originates out of the 
many instances of the file tokened in Doyle’s mind during the process of creating 
his novels – namely, it is grounded on many file-tokens. There is nothing else to 
the Holmes character than that very file-type. So, the Holmes character is a type 
of concept, grounded on multiple tokens of concepts, which are, as  pointed out 
by Vecsey, concrete particulars. But the type at stake is an abstract object, in the 
same sense in which types of things in general – in particular, word-types and 
sentence-types – can be considered to be abstract objects.
Moreover, as stated before, I have proposed to conceive of a fictional narrative in 
terms of a  set of sentence-types semantically correlated with a  set of thought-
types, which are grounded on the tokens entertained by the author during the 
creation process.5  Thought-types are constituted by concept-types, among which 
we find the individual and the indexical ones, namely, mental files. Accordingly, 
A  Study in Scarlet can be construed as a  set of correlations between sentences-
types and thought-types, among which, there are the ones containing the 
(individual) file-type HOLMES.
Given that literature is an allographic art (Goodman, 1968), literary artworks, as 
opposed to paintings and sculptures, are some sort of abstract object with 
multiple concrete instances. An author creates a fictional narrative by creating an 
instance or exemplar of it: in my terms, by semantically correlating, at 
a  particular time and a  concrete place, a  certain set of sentence-types with 
a certain set of thought-types, grounded on her own thought-tokens. The initial 
literary exemplar is thus a  set of sentence-tokens that gets semantically 
correlated with an author’s (set of) thought-types; literary exemplars might thus 
be construed as semantic vehicles of thought-types. In as far as our main topic, 
fictional names, is concerned, a  certain name-type gets semantically correlated 
with a certain file-type, which thereby becomes its referent.
In footnote 11 of his article, Vecsey claims that my main thesis about the 
reference of fictional names is in tension with the externalist conception of 
reference that I favour. With regard to this, I would like to point out that there is 
a sense in which ‘the external world’ can be thought to encompass both the usual 
material particulars and the concepts (however conceived of) that are common to 
the members of a  certain linguistic community (or, for that matter, of different 
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6 A more detailed explanation of the grounds for ascribing a declarative illocutionary force to 
fictive and parafictive uses of fictional sentences can be found in Orlando (2021).
linguistic communities), in as far as both kinds of entities belong to a public or 
shared domain. Likewise, artworks (however conceived of) are also public and, as 
such, can be considered to be part of ‘the external world’. 
Finally, Vecsey’s  last objection is epitomised in the following sentence: “the 
mental file framework is incompatible with the antirealist view of fictional 
objects.” (p. 42) I  think this is also an interesting piece of criticism, which 
deserves to be answered in some detail. First of all, Vecsey is right in claiming 
that “Orlando’s  mental file framework was designed to demonstrate that the 
antirealist theory of fictional objects can be reconciled with the claim that 
fictional utterances express propositions that are not imaginatively true, but 
instead true in the real world.” (p. 43) But, as I  see things at present, I  agree 
with him that this is a  mistake. I  no longer consider all uses of fictional 
discourse to be truth-assessable. As explained with some detail in my article 
(Orlando, 2021), I tend to think that fictive uses (namely, uses of the sentences 
constitutive of a  fictional narrative either by the author or by its subsequent 
readers) are not assertions, and hence not susceptible of being true or false, but 
speech acts with a declarative force, namely, those acts whose illocutionary point 
is to create something, “cases where one brings a state of affairs into existence 
by declaring it to exist.” (Searle, 1969, p. 358) The general point is that if an 
author successfully performs the act of creating a  narrative in which certain 
characters are featured in a fictional story, then there is such a narrative. 
More specifically, the speech act involved in the fictive use of a sentence by the 
creator of a fiction might be assigned two illocutionary points, along the lines of 
the promulgation of a  law by a  legislator: “Promulgating a  law has both 
a  declarational status (the propositional content becomes law) and a  directive 
status (the law is directive in intent).” (Searle, 1969, pp. 368-369) Likewise, an 
original fictive use has also both a  declarational status, since its content 
becomes part of a literary artwork, and a directive status, since that content has 
a  normative function in relation to future uses by readers and critics. They 
cannot then be classified as true or false. As for subsequent fictive uses by 
readers, they also have a declarative force but they seem to follow the pattern of 
the application of a law by a judge – rather than its promulgation by a legislator: 
they enforce the narrative as much as a judge’s decision enforces a pre-existent 
legislation, to which she must be faithful. Both kinds of declarative acts are 
regimented, by the pre-existent law and the pre-existent fictional narrative, 
respectively. Subsequent fictive uses are thus to be classified not as true or false 
but as faithful or unfaithful to the conceptual world of a (pre-existent) fictional 
narrative. Finally, parafictive uses (those conveying the fictional story facts from 
an external perspective, in words that are different from the original ones) 
could also be ascribed, at least in part, a  declarative status akin to 
a  judge’s  application of a  pre-existent legislation. But, given that they involve 
a  reformulation of the author’s  original discourse, they can be assimilated to 
those cases in which the law is not directly applied but involves the 
judge’s previous interpretation.6  
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It is worth pointing out that this hypothesis concerning the speech act status 
of fictive and parafictive uses of fictional discourse is not in tension with the 
core thesis that fictional names refer to individual concepts, since the presence 
of a reference relation is compatible with different kinds of speech acts: fiction 
may involve reference even if it does involve assertion and, hence, truth.
Vecsey goes on by claiming that mental files are “‘hybrid’ existents, which 
satisfy the standard criteria both of concreteness and abstractness.” (p. 43) As 
explained above, mental files are individual concepts, which, along cognitivist 
lines, can be understood as mental representations. Another option is, as is 
known, going Platonist, and construing concepts in terms of universals; but, as 
Vecsey himself acknowledges, this is not the tradition, characteristic of Fodor 
(1990) and Perry (1980), I explicitly identify myself with. Without intending to 
go deep into metaphysical waters, I  would like to point out that mental 
representations are concrete particulars that typically give rise to types, which, 
as claimed above, are not concrete particulars but abstract entities of some 
sort: there is a  sense in which different people (or, for that matter, the same 
person at different times) can be considered to share a mental representation, 
namely, a representation-type that plays a certain role or has a certain content, 
even if it can be tokened in different minds (or in the same mind at different 
times). As is known, this type-token ambiguity is also present regarding 
linguistic entities such as words and sentences. If this is what Vecsey means by 
‘hybridity’, I agree with him, but it is necessary to take into account that this is 
a phenomenon that conspicuously affects other entities besides mental files. 
Vecsey then concludes that “the central claims of the mental file framework are 
incompatible with the antirealist view.” (p. 43) More specifically, he voices the 
following complaint:
She [that is, I] contends that if readers want to talk about the 
protagonist of a  fictional work, then their referential intention is 
directed to something that belongs to the conceptual/abstract realm. 
And, on her view, this conceptual/abstract something exists 
contingently: it comes into being through an author’s  storytelling 
activity. But this is precisely what certain advocates of fictional realism 
claim. (p. 43)
He is right in demanding an explanation of why I  take my position to be 
a version of antirealism – or, as I  called it in my (2021) paper, an instance of 
‘moderate fictionalism’.7  Although the difference between my position and 
a realist one, in particular, abstractism, may not be considered to be significant, 
I think the two kinds of positions are in fact different enough.8 
As pointed out before, my proposal involves an ontological commitment to 
descriptive concepts and mental files, thoughts made out of them, and fictional 
narratives, constituted in part by those thoughts (and in part by the sentence-
types chosen by their respective authors). Fictional narratives, conceived of as 
sets of pairs of sentence-types and thought-types, are some kind of abstract 
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object. In as far as fictional names are taken to refer to mental files, they refer 
to parts of the abstract objects that are the fictional narratives in which they 
occur. But those narratives’ parts are concept-types, which in turn need not be 
conceived of as universals but can be construed in terms of relations of 
resemblance among particulars, i.e., relations among qualitatively similar 
mental representations tokened both in the author’s  and the readers and 
critics’ minds. Consequently, the only ontological commitment it involves, 
aside from the commitment to narratives, is the relatively uncontroversial 
commitment to concept-types partly constitutive of them, which might be in turn 
conceived of in terms of resembling mental particulars.9  Be that as it may, 
there is a  long path to go from those types to peculiar or sui generis abstract 
entities that are created simultaneously with fictional narratives (hence, on top 
of them), as is the case with the cultural artefacts with which typical abstractist 
approaches identify literary characters. The main point of my proposal is 
pointing to the possibility of combining the notion of reference to concepts 
with antirealism about fiction, on grounds of the fact that concepts are not 
a  peculiar or sui generis kind of abstract entities but the ubiquitous 
constituents of our thoughts. An antirealist about fiction, or a  moderate 
fictionalist, need not deny that there are concepts and thoughts, need she?
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